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Abstract 
Karl Polanyi is arguably one of the most significant economic sociologists. At first glance the links 
between Polanyi’s ideas about markets, society and institutions and strategy may not be obvious. 
However, there is a hereto unrecognised link between recent writing about institutions and strategy and 
Polanyi’s work. In this paper we, therefore, chart how, when recognised, these links reveal that Karl 
Polanyi’s work might provide new ways of thinking about strategy. Our over-riding claim is that 
Polanyi’s ideas reveal the importance of considering how strategies are defined, responded to, and 
ultimately rendered effective or ineffective in ways that are determined by relationships between 
markets, the state and society. It is thus crucial to understand strategy as embedded, this implying 
consideration of a strategy’s legitimacy in economy and society as an instituted process at any particular 
place and time. This also implies wider political questions about strategy in society and the extent to 
which strategists need to be aware of the ‘double movement’ Polanyi discusses and ensure strategies 
serve the interests of society as well as those of the market.    
 
 
Introduction: Locating Polanyi 
Karl Polanyi is arguably one of the most significant economic sociologists. He was born in Vienna in 
1886 where he lived until the 1930s, and rose to prominence through his critique of the Austrian School 
of economics. He latterly spent time in the UK, USA and Canada, with the publication of “The Great 
Transformation” (Polanyi, 1944) establishing Polanyi as a key socialist thinker on the economy.  
Perhaps most notable about Polanyi’s work is the longevity of its influence on economic 
sociology and related academic fields. This is most evident in the resurrection of debate about Polanyi’s 
ideas following the global financial crisis. In the years since 2008, and with the 50th anniversary of his 
death in 2014, Polanyian perspectives have been reenergised. From academic conferences and books 
seeking to re-interpret Polanyi’s ideas in the context of the current economic malaise (e.g. Brie, 2017; 
Dale, 2016), to prominent public academics such as Joseph Stiglitz who in his foreword to the 2001 
republication of The Great Transformation credits Polanyi for developing ideas that can explain the 
failure of Russia’s transition to a market economy and the flaws of the Washington consensus more 
generally, there is widespread interest in Polanyi’s ideas about the relationships between the state, 
markets, society and economy.  
Given the interest in Polanyi’s work, and as we discuss further below the ambiguity of some of 
his writing, it is well beyond the remit of this paper to provide a comprehensive account of all of 
Polanyi’s ideas. Instead, therefore, we opt to focus on some of the key conceptual debates that Polanyi’s 
work has inspired, through his discussion of the embedded economy. Specifically, we consider 
Polanyian perspectives on: markets as institutions; the role of the state in the creation of fictitious 
commodities; the way society influences market traits; and the associated double movement. These four 
core issues underlie Polanyi’s contribution to our understanding of the development of embedded 
market based capitalism, its contradictions, and instituted form. But why is this relevant to questions of 
strategy? 
At first glance the links between Polanyi’s ideas and strategy may not be obvious. After all, 
Polanyi was concerned with questions of economy and society, not firms, their agency and goals. There 
is, nonetheless, a conceptual bridge between the two worlds. The title of Polanyi’s 1957 chapter - “The 
economy as instituted process” – hints at a link between Polanyi’s work and economic sociology’s 
interest in institutions and their role in markets. We explore this link in more detail below. Importantly 
for our ambition here to develop a Polanyian perspective on strategy, this link allows us to connect to 
recent writing about institutions and strategy. This literature emphasises that “strategic choices are not 
only driven by industry conditions and firm-specific resources…but are also a reflection of the formal 
and informal constraints of a particular institutional framework” (Peng, 2002: 253). Indeed, Peng et al. 
(2008: 921) argue that the institutional perspective is one leg of a ‘strategy tripod’, whilst recent interest 
in topics such as “strategy-as-practice meets neo-institutional theory” (Suddaby et al., 2013), and 
“organizational responses to environmental demands” (Delmas and Toffel, 2008) attests to the 
importance of recognising the institutional embeddedness of strategy. The insights of Karl Polanyi are, 
however, overlooked in existing work; the lack of reference to his writing exemplifying this tendency. 
For instance, according to Google Scholar, there have been only three articles citing the work of Karl 
Polanyi published in Strategic Management Journal (Karl not to be confused with his brother Michael 
who wrote about tacit knowledge and gets citations in 76 different articles).1 
In this paper we, therefore, consider how Karl Polanyi’s work might provide new ways of 
thinking about strategy. Our over-riding claim is that Polanyi’s ideas reveal the importance of 
considering how strategies are defined, responded to, and ultimately rendered effective or ineffective 
in ways that are determined by relationships between markets, the state and society. It is thus crucial to 
understand strategy as embedded, this implying consideration of a strategy’s legitimacy in economy 
and society as an instituted process at any particular place and time. This also implies wider political 
questions about strategy in society and the extent to which strategists need to be aware of the ‘double 
movement’ Polanyi discusses and ensure strategies serve the interests of society as well as those of the 
market.    
We develop our analysis by outlining a Polanyian interpretation of the legitimacy of the 
strategies of English global law firms in one international market – Italy. This reveals that the way a 
                                                             
1 These articles deal, respectively, with issues of embeddedness in network structure and effects on alliances, 
embeddedness and subsidiary performance (Polanyi being cited generically in these two articles in relation to 
the term embeddedness), and the development of markets in the public sector (Polanyi being cited as part of a 
claim that markets have not been studied enough in strategy research). As a result, even when cited, Karl 
Polanyi’s ideas about institutions are not fully explored.  
strategy attempts to commodify labour and knowledge, and the extent to which this is viewed as morally 
and culturally legitimate, has significant effects on the success of a strategy. Specifically, we show that 
a double movement in terms of how the state institutes markets, and along with wider society responds 
to the attempts by corporations to operate in this market, is central in determining legitimacy and 
outcomes of strategies. This highlights the value of a Polanyian methodology for studying strategy that 
emphasises the embedding forces of market-state-society relationships.  
 
Reading Polanyi 
The Great Transformation (Polanyi, 1944) is probably Polanyi’s most debated contribution. The book 
charts the movement of European societies to an industrial era and the ideas and policies that the state 
drew on and developed to make industrial societies possible. The book fundamentally questions how 
markets work, and the implications for workers and society of the changes invoked to make market 
based capitalism function.  Perhaps one of the most distinctive features of all of Polanyi’s work, the 
Great Transformation included, is however its richness but also its inconsistency. As a result, the 
seventy or so years since the publication of The Great Transformation has been a period in which 
scholars have sought to apply and develop the ideas put forward, but also re-read and re-interpret the 
text. Indicative of this is the way the concept of embeddedness has been in part credited to Polanyi’s 
work (as well as that of Granovetter [1985] more recently), yet the term is only used twice in The Great 
Transformation (Krippner, 2001). The explanation for this lack of clarity is now well recognised: 
Polanyi changed his theoretical perspective on markets as he wrote the book, but in the rush to publish 
his work, in hope of influencing economic reforms, he did not have time to deal with the inconsistencies 
that arose from this change (Block, 2003). Our intention here is not to chart the tens of interpretations 
of Polanyi’s work that have emerged as a result of the inconsistencies. Rather, we focus on some of the 
underlying ideas that led Polanyi, and those who have developed his work, to claim that markets and 
the economy are always embedded. 
As the title of his 1957 piece “The economy as instituted process” suggests, Polanyi seeks to 
draw attention to how markets operate as a set of traits that are deliberately constructed to enable 
economic exchange. Traits refer to the key characteristics that are crucial for a market to operate – i.e., 
they are fundamental features of a market based society.  As Buğra (2007: 2) notes, the traits of markets 
that Polanyi observed were distinctive in that they were constructed for no other purpose than to allow 
market based economic exchange. They did not exist before the transformation to an industrial market 
society and were constructed deliberately by the state to make such a society possible. This differed 
when compared to previously recognised forms of exchange such as reciprocity and redistribution 
which were guided by understandings of kinship and religious duty respectively that had wider societal 
functions (Lie, 1991: 222). As a result of the distinctive nature of market traits, Polanyi called for the 
development of the: 
“conceptual tools required to penetrate the maze of social relationships in which the economy 
was embedded. This is the task of what we will here call institutional analysis” (Polanyi, 1957: 
242; cited in Lie, 1991: 221). 
This institutional analysis was built first and foremost as a critique of orthodox neoclassical economics. 
As part of his disagreement with the way the Austrian School of economics conceived of markets, and 
more widely the view that the idea of laissez faire markets (free from government intervention) was 
flawed, Polanyi sought to show that markets could not be understood as analytically separate from state 
and society. He thus developed a methodology which takes account of economy-society relations in the 
institutionalisation of markets (Gemici, 2008); a methodology that has regained traction in the wake of 
the global financial crisis and the subsequent discrediting (in some circles at least) of laissez faire 
thinking. For example, in the Great Transformation Polanyi (1944) documents the rise of market society 
in England and how, contrary to neoclassical explanations of markets operating independently of the 
state, the state and reforms it imposed on society were essential for the market to function. He contends 
that laissez faire markets were designed and implemented by the state. Readings of his work have thus 
focussed on three important ideas developed as part of his institutional analysis – the role of the state in 
creating fictitious commodities, societal influences on market traits, and the double movement. It is 
these ideas and their relationship to the central concept of embeddedness that we consider here as 
offering potentially useful insights into strategy. 
 
The state, fictitious commodities, market traits, and the double movement 
 For Polanyi, the state is central to the construction of the market as an institution, but has a dual and 
contradictory role. On the one hand, the state enables the emergence of markets through regulatory 
action that allows the production of fictitious commodities. Fictitious commodities are things that pre-
date the market but which were rendered tradable as part of state led transformations designed to create 
a market society. Land, labour, money and most recently knowledge have all been highlighted as 
fictitious commodities that the state, through enclosure rights, employment regimes, banking systems 
and intellectual property rights rendered tradable. As Polanyi (1944: 146) wrote, the market “was 
opened and kept open by an enormous increase in continuous centrally organized and controlled 
interventionism” (quoted in Krippner, 2001: 782). Exemplifying this, in the fallout of the global 
financial crisis it was national governments, in the USA and UK particularly, that ensured markets did 
not implode. This point, which has been central to many analyses of the flaws of laissez faire thinking 
which are central to neoliberal, Washington consensus politics (e.g., Peck, 2010), focuses on the way 
state regulation allows land, labour, and money to be commodified through property rights and other 
regimes, even though they naturally do not exist as tradable entities. As Polanyi (1944: 72, original 
emphasis; quoted in Lie, 1991: 223) notes: 
“Labor, land, and money are obviously not commodities; the postulate that anything that is 
bought and sold must have been produced for sale is emphatically untrue in regard to them”. 
Commodification through state actions is thus essential if markets are to operate. On the other hand, 
however, the state also has an important role in taming markets, as became clear with the financial crisis 
of 2008 which highlighted the dangers of the state under-regulating markets. In recognition of the 
danger associated with commodification and unconstrained markets, the state puts in place regulations 
such as employment laws and social safety nets, and regulators to continuously police these regulations, 
as well as monetary controls, designed to rein in markets and protect citizens from their effects (Buğra, 
2007: 3). This occurs because “the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an 
institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance 
of society” (Polanyi, 1944: 3; cited in Block, 2003: 282).  
Significantly, this dual function of the state, and in particular its taming role, is influenced in 
important ways by the values of the society the state represents. What is permitted in the process of 
commodification varies from society to society, and rules designed to tame markets similarly display 
inter-national variations. As Block (2003: 295) notes, morals and customary law all generate belief 
systems that create such variations. A good example of this relates to the role of unions and worker 
representatives. The well-documented (see, for example, Dore, 2000) differences between the ‘right to 
work’ states of the USA which prohibit union representation and German collective bargaining and 
worker representation on firm boards illustrate divergent belief systems about the rights and 
responsibilities of workers and companies. Hence the concept of embeddedness has also become 
associated with place-specificity (Hess, 2004) as markets when viewed through a Polanyian lens appear 
as geographically heterogeneous institutional assemblages. The varieties of capitalism literature, 
inspired by the seminal work of Hall and Soskice (2001), has developed this view most thoroughly, 
pointing to how capitalisms vary from society to society because of the different enabling and taming 
roles played by the state through its varying degrees and forms of regulatory effort.  
These observations about the dual role of the state all feed into Polanyi’s assertion that a double 
movement exists in which the imperative of capitalists to expand the market is met with counter 
resistance designed to protect society from ill effects. This countermovement, as well as emerging from 
state action, can be a spontaneous reaction by society. In this regards Polanyi, being inspired by Marxist 
thinking but also critical of its limitations, is sensitive to ideas of class revolt. Hence workers, but also 
government officials, and even some land and business owners might mobilise to resist forms of 
commodification deemed inappropriate according to local moral or cultural norms (Gemici, 2008). 
We take, then, a fundamental point from Polanyi’s ideas about markets as institutions, the role 
of the state in the creation of fictitious commodities, the way society influences market traits, and the 
associated double movement: understanding the relations between markets, the state and society is 
fundamental when examining economies. This implies that when considering firms, and in turn their 
strategies, the effects of these relationships need due consideration. We thus now consider how such 
considerations might be incorporated into discussions of strategy. We do this by introducing the idea of 
embedded strategy. 
 
Embedded strategy     
As noted in the introductory section, building a bridge between Polanyi’s ideas and strategy research is 
in part facilitated by work on institutional approaches to strategy. Whittington (2001) provides a useful 
overview of what he calls ‘systemic perspectives on strategy’ of which institutional approaches are one 
stream. Whilst not referencing Polanyi, and instead considering ‘neo-institutional’ questions about 
pressures for conformity, Whittington (2001: 26) suggests that those doing strategy are “rooted deeply 
in densely interwoven social systems”. This, Whittington argues, has implications for the national 
specificity of strategy decision making, something Whitley’s (1998) work on national business systems 
has also shown. Specifically, it means country of origin effects result in dramatic differences in the 
strategies of, for example, American, German and Japanese companies. One key difference here is the 
contrast between the strategies of US corporations that focus on short term profitability and shareholder 
value and the strategies of Japanese firms which are much more concerned with market share 
(Whittington, 2001). 
There is much more that can be said about the impact of national specificities on strategy 
formulation and implementation if Polanyi’s ideas are more thoroughly explored. To do this requires, 
however, recognition that the ‘neo-institutional’ questions that often come to fore, and which emphasise 
what firms and strategies must conform with rather than why particular pressures for conformity exist, 
need to be supplanted by questions about the nature and effects of market-state-society relationships. 
This point relates to the rupture between the old and new institutionalism. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) 
in their seminal work re-orientated many scholars working on institutional analyses towards ‘new’ 
questions of legitimacy and isomorphic pressures for conformity; thus moving the attention away from 
‘old’ concerns with agency, influence, politics and power. As Stinchcombe (1997) suggests, the insights 
provided by those building the foundations of the ‘old’ institutionalism have been, perhaps too quickly, 
forgotten. Calls for a rapprochement have highlighted the potential for re-injecting ‘old’ insights into 
contemporary analyses (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Selznick, 1996); although arguably many 
European institutonalists never left these questions behind (see, for example, Thelen, 2004).  Arguably 
in the literature on strategy the potential of ‘old’ institutionalists to offer valuable insights appears to 
have largely been ignored, and Polanyi’s ideas provide one way of re-injecting such issues into debates.  
In particular, Polanyi’s work on market traits and his description of how the state shapes the 
production of fictitious commodities such as labour are valuable when used as a way of getting to the 
roots of the moral and cultural beliefs that are specific to a society and which effect strategies and their 
outcomes. Indeed, the double movement idea suggests that as firms seek to expand their markets 
through capitalist strategies, citizens and the state will resist if these strategies and the commodification 
they attempt transgress moral or cultural beliefs. Strategy literatures that adopt ‘neo-institutional’ 
perspectives to highlight how pressures for conformity affect corporate behaviour begin to address such 
issues when they document the importance of legitimacy in strategy formulation and implementation 
(Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). But, a Polanyian view can take this further and provide a valuable way of 
understanding the reasons for why resistance may emerge and the kind of compromises needed to 
legitimate a strategy in different societal contexts.    
In the remainder of the paper we examine the case of English global law firms and their 
strategies in Italy from the early 1990s to the early years of the new millennium. In doing so, we develop 
a Polanyian methodology for analysing embedded strategy. This methodology emphasises the 
embedding forces of market-state-society relationships that give character to the strategies of the firms 
in question, the underlying beliefs and customs responsible for this, and the way the legitimacy of these 
strategies can be affected by a double movement. As such, in a somewhat radical departure from 
dominant approaches to strategy, it is a methodology that asks about strategy in its broader economic 
and societal setting. We build our analysis using archival and interview data from a research project 
focussed on the internationalization of global English law firms in Italy. The empirical methodology 
for this study is detailed elsewhere (see Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2016). Here, rather than presenting 
empirical results, we offer a conceptual analysis that interprets the strategies of the firms in question 
through a Polanyian lens. We begin by presenting a short synopsis of our case study, focusing in 
particular on the strategies deployed by the firms in question and how these were received in the Italian 
context. We then examine how a Polanyian analysis focussed on the key concepts of market traits, 
commodification, and the double movement help explain the events we observe and in particular the 
success and failures of the various strategies deployed.  
 
The arrival of UK firms and the emergence of an Italian corporate legal field (1990-2000) 
In this section we contextualise our Polanyian analysis of strategy below. We outline the strategy of 
English law firms in Italy, before moving on to ask about ways of interpreting this strategy, its nature 
and effects, through questions about market-state-society relations.   
English law firms began to enter the Italian market in the 1990s as part of the broader process 
of Europeanization and the creation of the single market. The Italian market up to that point was 
dominated by small scale family based practices. Very few employed more than a dozen partners or 
had more than one office, usually in Rome or Milan. They had a generalist orientation, focused on 
contentious work and cultivated long term often generational relationships with their clients. In this 
context English firms sought to develop a full-service capability, with a view of achieving a dominant 
position in the Italian legal market. Indeed, a number of our respondents explicitly referred to an 
ambition to achieve a top 3 position within Italy. This of course involved developing domestic law 
capabilities, servicing Italian clients and employing locally qualified lawyers; as such this strategy was 
characterised by a high degree of local responsiveness (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998) as firms sought to 
adapt to local conditions. As a result, by 2001 80% of Clifford Chance’s 145 lawyers in Italy were 
locally qualified (The Lawyer, 1999; Cahill, 2003a), and 85-90% of clients at Simmons and Simmons 
were Italian (Cahill, 2003b), whilst these firms also begun to develop a capillary presence through the 
Italian market opening additional offices in regional centres like Padua or Turin. Importantly, these 
offices, as part of efforts to maximize local responsiveness, were afforded very high levels of 
independence from headquarters, enjoying high degree of autonomy in matters such as client 
management, pricing structures, working methods, remuneration, and even branding, whereby the 
Italian operations often had a different name from the parent organization. Table 1 summaries the key 
features of the initial strategy of English firms in Italy. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE  
   
Yet, with the new millennium as English firms begun to review their international operations, a revised 
strategy became dominant. This new ‘one firm’ strategy, which is extensively documented in the 
literature (Barrett et al, 2005; Segal-Horn and Dean, 2009; Muzio and Faulconbridge, 2013), prioritizes, 
in Bartlett and Ghoshal’s terms (1998), global integration over local responsiveness and is predicated 
on the belief that competitive advantage is derived from the ability to provide a globally consistent 
service experience across the world. As we highlight below, a Polanyian reading of strategy reveals 
fundamental contradictions in the idea of ‘global consistency’ when markets are instituted by nation-
states in geographically variegated ways. The firms in question were, however, blind to this and their 
strategy inspired a refocusing away from local clients and issues and towards the servicing of the Italian 
leg of global transactions. These deals often involved global clients not based in Italy, were structured 
in English law, and focused on financial rather than corporate matters. As firms re-oriented themselves 
away from local markets towards the global network, the emphasis shifted towards hiring a new profile 
of professional. The local superstar practitioners, that were sought for their reputations and corporate 
connections, but which jealously guarded their autonomy and independence, were not suitable for the 
new strategy and ensuing work practices. Rather, firms targeted a younger cohort of ‘cosmopolitans’ 
(Smets et al, 2012), these were Italian lawyers who often were dually qualified or had significant 
overseas working experiences and would fit more easily with the more integrated and managed working 
methods that the ‘one firm’ strategy required. Furthermore, as firms focused on global financial 
transactions, they lost the need for the regional presence and were able to retreat onto the city of Milan 
as Italy’s key financial centre. Table 2 summaries the key features of the one firm strategy. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Yet the transition from the original ‘top 3’ strategy to the new ‘one firm’ one, was not unproblematic. 
It generated a series of tensions which threatened the firms’ presence in the Italian market. The ‘one 
firm’ strategy has far reaching organizational consequences as it not only involves the adoption of 
common service practices, but also necessitates the standardization of back office processes including 
governance structures, recruitment and promotion processes, training and socialization programmes, as 
well as remuneration and billing practices (Muzio and Faulconbridge, 2013). In short, the ‘one firm’ 
model demands that each office of the firm operates as part of one seamless unit, regardless of local 
nuances in professional practice or culture. This of course, undermined the vast degrees of autonomy 
and discretion that local offices and partners had enjoyed under the previous ‘top 3’ strategy. And as a 
result, it generated significant resistance from Italian stakeholders. Furthermore, the ‘one firm’ model 
sought to integrate local offices around English values, practices and ways of working, such as a 
transactional approach to legal work and client relationships, the development of standardised solutions 
and knowledge management systems, the use of team work and seniority based pay systems.  As a 
strategy, it was very much embedded in the institutions of the City of London and reproduced a large 
scale organizational approach to legal practice which was typical of that geographical context (Muzio 
and Faulconbridge, 2013; Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2016). 
As such the transition to the new ‘one firm’ strategy placed significant strains on the Italian 
operations of firms, leading to de-mergers, office closures and high-profile defections. In particular 
these firms lost their key local partners with Vittorio Grimaldi walking out from Clifford Chance, 
Roberto Casati from Allen and Overy  and Lega and Colucci from Freshfields (Sutton, Jan 2006; 
Griffiths, 14/2/2005). Besides these high profile losses, our firms were affected in the post-integration 
period by a steady stream of defections, loosing associates, partners and sometime whole teams, or 
offices, such as Allen and Overy’s Turin’s office (Moshinsky, 30/10/06) or Simmons and Simmons’ 
Padua office (Swift, 14/6/10). Defectors tended to relocate to the growing number of Italian law firms 
or to US practices, which tended to offer business models and working cultures which were more 
congenial to their own values and attitudes.     
This raises the following question: How does a Polanyian analysis help us to understand the 
difficulties experienced by English law firms in Italy, and the failure of their ‘one firm’ strategies? Some 
of the problems described above might be explained by literatures that focus on change management 
strategies (Pettigrew et al., 2001; Wilson, 1992), questions of power and politics in strategy 
implementation (Carter et al., 2010; Pfeffer, 1992), or the existing International Business literature on 
institutional distance (Kostova and Roth, 2002; Peng, 2002). All of these literatures would undoubtedly 
add something of value. But, as we outline below, a Polanyi informed analysis brings new 
considerations into view. In particular, it helps reveal how the moral and cultural foundations of the 
Italian legal market ultimately led to the failure of the ‘one firm’ strategy. This, in turn, suggests a 
greater role for moral and cultural considerations in strategy research as part of a widening of the lens 
to take account of strategy in societal context. In particular, our case study reveals how strategic failure 
derives from a lack of attention to the way strategy is a product of and mediated by market-state-society 
relations.  
 
The traits of the instituted market 
As noted above, Polanyi believed that understanding the instituted economy is central to explaining the 
connections, mediated through the state, between markets and their broader social context. Analysis of 
the instituted traits of markets provides a means of revealing these connections. We thus begin by 
considering the traits – i.e., rules, norms and cultures - of the Italian legal market and how these were 
instituted by the Italian state. This latterly helps us explain how the failure of the ‘one firm’ strategy 
resulted from tensions between the approaches to retailing legal services proposed by this strategy and 
dominant understandings of what constituted legitimate market behaviour in the Italian legal field.        
The Italian legal market is heavily regulated. The market is structured around a state sponsored 
profession (Ordine), with the state exercising strong control on who can practice law and how; these 
two dimensions being referred to in the literature (Abel, 1988) as the regulation of the production of 
producers, and regulation of the production by producers. Indeed, a European Commission report 
(Paterson et al., 2003) classified the Italian legal profession as highly regulated with a score 6.4, against 
a score of 4 assigned to England & Wales. Specifically, the Italian system is quite restrictive in terms 
of how legal work is organized and retailed. Restrictions at the time of the events here described 
included: bans on advertising, minimum fee levels, naming restrictions that prohibited firms holding 
the name of anyone but a practicing lawyer, domicile obligations for court based proceeding, and bans 
on the use of client names for marketing purposes. In Polanyian terms, these are all examples of the 
‘double movement’ of the state regulating markets to prevent what is considered to be dangerous and 
potentially causing societal ills, in this case relating to the commercialisation of safeguard legal services.  
A key trait of the Italian legal market that regulation reproduces is a population of small firms. 
Even in the late 1990s and early 2000s, firms very rarely exceeded 15-20 lawyers (The Lawyer, 1999; 
Testoni, 2013). Italian elite law firms were often run by university professors with a successful 
individual surrounding himself with apprentices (Danilo, 1998; Malatesta, 2006; 2011). As a result, like 
Italian business more broadly (Trigilia and Burroni, 2009), law firms in Italy were informally organized, 
paternalistic in their governance, and run as personal fiefdoms to the point that they would often cease 
to exist when their founder died or retired (see Pawsey, 2003). A key factor sustaining this model, as 
we note below, were regulations which effectively banned employment in a law firm, this preventing 
the emergence of the leveraged corporate structures common in England. 
A further important trait is the dyadic relationships between vendors and purchasers, in this 
case lawyers and clients. Strong norms governed client relationships in Italy which tended to be long-
term, personal (whereby clients developed relationships with individual lawyers), close and informal. 
Markets were thus instituted in ways that allowed clients to purchase the expertise but also the trust of 
an individual lawyer. Much advice was provided outside of formal transactions, lawyers being the 
trusted advisors and personal confidents of clients and thus being consulted regularly and informally on 
both legal and business matters. Thus, Italian business lawyers were expected to assist with a broad 
range of issues and offer ‘total support, unscrupulousness, no misgivings which may alienate the client’ 
and the general feeling of being part of a shared enterprise (Gianaria and Mittone, 2007: 90). Indeed, it 
was common for lawyers to sit on the executive boards of their clients (Cantagalli, 2011).  
These traits of the Italian legal market did not come about by accident. Rather, as Polanyi 
suggests, the traits are indicative of the way the state sought to create institutions of market exchange 
that reflected wider societal understandings of morally and culturally legitimate practices. The second 
stage in a Polanyian analysis involves, then, interrogating connections between market traits and 
societal logics. This is achieved through consideration of the way fictitious commodities are created, 
and the implications of this for what is deemed legitimate practice in the market.    
 
Fictitious commodities in the legal market 
As outlined above, commodification is a process of creating tradable (fictitious) commodities out of 
entities that have to be organized in certain ways to make them tradable, given that their innate form 
does not necessarily lend itself to market exchange. For the legal profession, commodification relates 
to two main entities, labour and knowledge. It involves a number of actors. This of course includes the 
state, but also other stakeholders such as professional associations and universities. The former have 
delegated responsibility from the state for setting and policing the rules and norms that govern entry to 
and practice within legal markets, including matters such as qualification requirements, the governance 
of firms, client relationship practices, and even in some cases fee setting (Faulconbridge and Muzio, 
2012; MacDonald, 1995). The latter produce the supply of labour with the relevant skillsets and mind-
sets to practice as lawyers. In relation to our analysis here, through their role the state, the university 
and the professional associations reproduce the Italian legal field as a recognised area of institutional 
life (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) with patterns of accepted behaviour and organization tied to shared 
understandings of legitimate ways of commodifying labour and knowledge.  
The capturing of human efforts through the paying of a wage by an employer is the fundamental 
process that Polanyi suggested allowed the commodification of labour. In the Italian legal profession, 
significant restrictions existed in this regard, with the employment of salaried lawyers by firms being 
prohibited in most forms (Muzio and Faulconbridge, 2013). Regulations mandated that ‘ius postulandi’ 
(the ability to provide legal representation) should be restricted to self-employed lawyers, meaning 
firms could have partners (these treated as co-owners of the firm rather than employees) but not salaried 
lawyers. Employees did exist and are in rapid expansion but have to be disguised as freelance 
contractors who invoice for their services. The result was that Italian lawyers tended to view themselves, 
and legally existed in many cases as autonomous practitioners. Hence, they developed their own 
independent client bases and could not be restrained by ‘non-compete’ clauses. This acted as a powerful 
brake for the expansion of English law firms into Italy, as they  relied on highly leveraged business 
models, featuring high proportions of salaried staff to partners, which were difficult to replicate in the 
Italian market. Related regulation prohibited, as noted above, the use of the firm’s name in the absence 
of its originator. This further hindered the development of the permanent and stable corporate entities 
which the ‘one firm’ strategy relied upon.  
Underlying the restrictions on the commodification of labour in Italy were strong (and perhaps 
self-serving) moral beliefs in the notion of ‘terzieta’ (Alpa, 2005): the belief that the professionals 
needed to remain independent from external influences, and therefore had to be autonomous and free 
from the constraints imposed by an employer. Furthermore, these moral beliefs correspond with some 
strong cultural preferences for entrepreneurship and small-scale practice whereby Italian lawyers are 
suspicious of the large scale organizational models which are dominant in Anglo-Saxon contexts. Hence 
Italian lawyers never saw themselves as fully part of a firm given their independent orientation, whilst 
the state, the university and professional associations supported and reproduced this stance through their 
actions and pronouncements which treated small scale practice as the norm. As a result, in Italy labour 
was never fully commodified and this, in turn, limited the extent to which firms could control market 
exchanges within the legal field. We return to this point below when we consider the implications for 
the ‘one firm’ strategy.    
A second concern in terms of commodification relates to knowledge. Polanyi never explicitly 
considered knowledge and its commodification, but as Jessop (2007) notes, in the era of the knowledge 
economy attempts to commodify knowledge are common given the emphasis firms place on capturing, 
storing, and exploiting knowledge (on this in law firms, see Faulconbridge, 2015). Two processes are 
of concern. First, the means by which knowledge is captured, in machines, routines or otherwise, thus 
extracting it from human beings. This allows knowledge to be traded as an abstract commodity, instead 
of relying on human interactions between two parties. Second, commodification involves processes 
which emphasise profit maximisation, and the efficient leverage of knowledge resources, with less 
emphasis being placed on quality or morality. This involves restructuring the exchange relationship 
around standardised and packaged products, rather than bespoke relational solutions (Suddaby and 
Greenwood, 2001). Jessop (2007) compares craft guilds with corporations to differentiate between un- 
and commodified knowledge forms. 
In Italy, attempts to commodify legal knowledge were extremely restricted. The predominant 
mode of exchange was through long term relationships between a generalist professional and an 
individual client, the client expecting an informal and highly personal service from their trusted advisor 
(Giannaria and Mittone, 2005). Of key importance in explaining the limited scope of commodification 
is the legacy of the civil law doctrinal tradition which again has specific moral and cultural foundations. 
In particular, the civil law tradition tended to understand law as a ‘purely analytical, intellectual 
construct, a sealed system of logically interconnected propositions impermeable to the economic 
pressures of the business world’ (Osiel, 1990: 1037). In this context lawyers understood their roles as 
technicians or legal scientists whose excellence derived from their mastery of the codes and their ability 
to apply these to the contingencies of human action.  In this context, the assumption was that knowledge 
could not be easily abstracted from the individual practitioner/client relationship. Indeed, regulations 
such as minimum fee levels, advertising bans and domiciliation requirementsi, existed to protect 
individuals from competition and the temptation to engage in commodification processes that featured 
the mass production and packaging of legal services. This was the reverse of the situation in England 
where such regulations had long been abandoned (Abel, 1988: Muzio and Ackroyd, 2005).  
As a result, Italy did not have a distinctively corporate market for legal services, based on short 
term transactional relationships, competitive tendering processes and preferred supplier lists, as existed 
in other markets such as England (Micelotta, 2010). The value placed on long term personal 
relationships between an individual lawyer and their client also explains why Italian firms tended to 
have highly dispersed remuneration systems which rewarded disproportionally a few key individuals 
(named partners, family members or rain makers, who controlled key client relationships) at the expense 
of others (Danilo, 1998; The Lawyer, 1999; Pawsey, 2003; Sutton, 2006: 73 -74; Ruckin, 2007a). 
Partnerships for instance, tended to operate on very wide equity spreads (earning differential between 
top and bottom earning partners) approaching ratios of 8:1; to give a sense of how extreme this is, 2.5:1 
is usual for English firms (The Lawyer, 1999; 2001). This all relates to an understanding of where 
knowledge resides: in the individual, with exchange and reward for it operating at the individual level.  
As Figure 1 outlines, the Italian legal market was thus defined by its distinctive traits, these 
traits being (re)produced by processes of labour and knowledge commodification influenced by 
particular cultural and moral influences. This created a distinctive environment into which the ‘one 
firm’ strategy was introduced. As we outlined above, the introduction of this strategy was problematic, 
not least because it was devised in the market environment of the City of London, which had been 
instituted in very different ways. We, therefore, turn in the next section to a Polanyian explanation of 
the particular responses to the ‘one firm’ strategy, and the relationships between the traits of the market, 
underlying cultural and moral beliefs, and questions of strategic legitimacy. 
 
[Insert figure 1 here] 
 
The double movement and the failure of strategy 
As a result of the limits outlined above to the commodification of labour and knowledge in the Italian 
legal market, the ‘one firm’ strategy and the practices it sought to impose were seen as morally and 
culturally illegitimate. This is because the  City of London as the context in which the ‘one firm’ strategy 
was instituted, had very different characteristics and, in particular, sustained much greater degrees of 
commodification than the Italian legal market. As a result, when exported into the Italian market, the 
‘one firm’ strategy generated the double movement that Polanyi suggested would emerge, as the state 
and wider society felt moral disdain for this particular set of market practices and behaviours. This is 
somewhat ironic. Larson (1977) suggests the professions are an ‘accessory’ to the double movement, 
helping moderate the effects of capitalism through their gatekeeping role. In our case, however, the 
story is reversed. English lawyers are viewed as colluding with capitalists and acting in inappropriate 
ways (an accusation that is now increasingly made against professions worldwide, see for example 
Mitchell and Sikka, 2011).    
The double movement resulted, in particular, from the way the ‘one firm’ strategy proposed 
structures in which lawyers were treated as employees of a corporate entity; i.e., approaches which 
assumed a high level of commodification of professional labour and knowledge. In particular, lawyers 
were subject to various human resource management techniques to increase the efficiency and 
consistency of their services, and were expected to serve the priorities of the firm in return for a salary. 
Crucial to this was the notion of leverage, as firms made money by increasing the number of salaried 
staff relative to partners and from deploying economies of scale as they relied on integrated teams 
staffed with many junior employees and few senior partners (Ackroyd and Muzio, 2007; Faulconbridge 
and Muzio, 2009). Moreover, the ‘one firm’ strategy imposed high degrees of knowledge 
commodification as it sought to embed professional knowledge in routines, best practices, and 
knowledge management systems, and replace individual discretion and personalized exchange relations 
with processes of routinization, standardization and commodification. This reflected the culture of 
English legal markets which, certainly since the 1980s, saw law as being a business as much as a 
profession.  
The reaction of Italian professional associations, lawyers and clients to such a model of 
commodification was far from positive. Italian lawyers viewed the systems associated with the ‘one 
firm’ strategy as an affront to the prestige of the legal profession, its basis in scientific expertise, and its 
moral mission and civic role. Thus, one of our respondents referred to how the ‘specialization’ and 
‘Tayloristic approach to work’ typical of English firms led ‘to a form of intellectual poverty and stunted 
professional development’ whilst another recounts how the one firm model invoked on behalf of Italian 
professionals feelings of ‘being put through a sausage machine’ and of being ‘compared to a 
spreadsheet’. Clients too had some significant doubts with regards to aspects of the one firm strategy. 
These included the expectation of ‘only talking to the owner of the firm and not an employee’, a 
preference for day-to-day partner lead advice rather than ‘scores of associates working on a large 
transaction’, and frustration if not offense at the refusal by lawyers working for English firms to join 
their executive boards (‘lawyers were not allowed to sit on the executive boards of their clients. This is 
a grave offense for an Italian client’). The result was that English firms failed to make headway with 
local corporate clients. In the words of a local star practitioner ‘Italian clients think we have learnt a lot 
from international firms and they are thankful. But they continue to come to us’ (Pawsey, 2003: 72). 
The one firm model clashed, then, with the moral values and cultural preferences held by local 
practitioners and clients, leading to a strong double-movement which manifested itself in the steady 
stream of demerges and defections discussed in a previous section. 
Of course, it was not just cultural and moral disdain that caused English firms problems. 
Specific regulations existed in order to protect the independence of lawyers from commercial and 
managerial pressures, and these clashed with the ‘one firm’ strategy which was so reliant on practices 
which were illegitimate or illegal in the Italian context. For example, Italian professional associations 
accused Freshfields and Allen and Overy in the Italian parliament of undercutting fees by almost 30 per 
cent (Mizzi, 1999). This was in violation of local minimum fees tariffs which, as discussed, were 
intended to protect individual professionals from attempts to commodify their labour and knowledge 
and leverage this in ways designed to reduce costs. As a further example, the Milan and Rome bar 
investigated a range of large commercial firms for disclosing transaction information, which whilst 
being standard marketing practice in London was forbidden by Italy’s professional conduct code 
(Collins, 23/06/2005). Indeed, over the last 20 years local professional associations such as the CNF 
(Consiglio Nazionale Forense) and OUA (Organismo Unitario Avvocatura) have been fighting a 
regulatory and normative battle against international law firms, seeking to deligitimize their business 
model and defend traditional Italian law firms. Thus in their words ‘professional firms are not 
enterprises’ (CNF president Guido Alpa, cited in Micelotta and Washington, 2013: 1156) whilst ‘Italian 
lawyers cannot become employees in law firms’ (OUA President Maurizio DeTilla, cited in Cavestri 
2010). These quotes reflect the moral and cultural foundations of the Italian legal profession which 
stress independence, individualism, informality and small scale organization, all of this contrasting 
starkly with the high levels of commodification and organization which characterise the ‘one firm’ 
strategy. The following quote by CNF’s president indicates clearly the double-movement that this 
inspired: 
‘Individual professionalism is being marginalized by organizational forms of professionalism 
with all their well-known problems […]. We need to oppose these tendencies […]’ (Alpa, 2010) 
Over time, there have been some regulatory developments which suggest the Italian state, in its role as 
instituted of markets, has tried to reconfigure the traits of markets to be more open to the commercial 
approaches that characterised the ‘one firm’ model (Micelotta and Washington, 2013). Nonetheless, in 
our period of analysis, there is little doubt that the initial failures of the ‘one firm’ strategy outlined in 
our opening story resulted from the double movement triggered by attempts to operate in Italy in ways 
deemed by the state and wider society to be illegitimate.  
 
Polanyian methodologies and embedded strategy research 
We suggest above that to understand the failure of the ‘one firm’ strategy of English firms in Italy it is 
important to consider the legitimacy of the strategy in the context of the instituted legal market, its traits, 
and forms of labour and knowledge commodification. In particular, we draw attention to how the 
illegitimacy of many of the structures and practices proposed by the ‘one firm’ model led to a double 
movement in which the state which plays a key role in instituting the Italian legal market counter-moves 
against English firms, as do clients and lawyers themselves. What are the implications of this Polanyian 
interpretation for strategy research? 
Table 3 outlines our Polanyian methodology for strategy research. At one level, the view of the 
instituted market adopted here helps reveals the importance of connecting questions of strategic success 
or failure to questions of culture and morality in the society in which a strategy is both devised and 
imposed. Arguably, the success of the ‘top 3’ strategy (table 1) in securing mergers and access for 
English firms to the Italian market was its ‘local responsiveness’. In the ‘top 3’ strategy there is much 
flexibility to comply with local expectations and ensure that structures and practices are considered 
legitimate. As such, in the 1990s the ‘top 3’ strategy of English firms was able to respond to the specific 
cultural and moral influences on the commodification of labour and knowledge. In contrast, the ‘one 
firm’ strategy (table 2) and its emphasis of integration and consistency introduces structures and 
practices into the Italian market from the home-country (England) of the firms in question, and creates 
limited possibilities for the accommodation of local preferences. Hence the double movement and 
illegitimacy we document. 
 
[Insert table 3 here] 
 
This implies that questions of legitimacy in strategy formulation and implementation need to be 
considered not just intra-organizationally in terms of how a strategy is ‘sold’ to corporate constituencies, 
or within the industry field in terms of how competitors, clients, or suppliers view a strategy and its 
compliance with industry norms. Consideration also needs to be given to the wider societal view of a 
strategy, and the implications for how the state but also other constituencies react because of cultural or 
moral understandings of legitimacy. This relates to Polanyi’s point that in instituting markets the state 
has a paradoxical role of opening the way for trade exchanges, but also putting measures in place to 
protect society from excesses perceived as undesirable. It also relates to the more Marxist orientation 
of Polanyi and the belief that members of society can react against markets, along with the state in a 
double movement, when cultural and moral boundaries are transgressed. As such, legitimacy becomes 
an issue of not simply whether a strategy promises to deliver in terms of understandings of 
product/service quality, efficiency, or innovativeness. It is also an issue of whether the process of 
producing and trading the product/service adheres to the society’s cultural and moral beliefs about what 
is desirable. 
Strategy research needs, then, to concern itself with issues that seem far away from the 
organizational or industry focus that might be expected. It needs to be embedded in a wider societal 
context, and to become skilled at researching and understanding the implications of the cultures and 
morals that determine legitimacy in a market. This sociological view of embedded strategy is in part 
what others have proposed through work on an institutional perspective on strategy (Peng, 2002; Peng 
et al., 2008). But, it takes things further as the focus is not limited to regulations that might prevent a 
strategy being implemented, or norms which determine the effectiveness of a strategy, for supply 
network efficiency, innovation or whatever it may be. The focus is also on the extent to which legitimacy 
in society exists, and how this informs or not the development of a double movement. As we have shown 
here, this double movement matters because it involves the state and can lead to regulatory redress, but 
it also involves wider society which includes clients, employees, the media and in some cases the 
general public also. As such, cultural and moral legitimacy concerns relate not to whether a strategy in 
and of itself allows a goal to be achieved; it could be argued that the ‘one firm’ strategy was very 
effective at producing corporate legal services in a globally aligned way. It is also not about straight 
questions of legality; the ‘one firm’ strategy whilst suffering from some not insignificant legal hurdles 
was not ultimately sunk by regulatory problems. Rather, cultural and moral concerns imply more 
holistic issues that come back to the connections between a market, its traits, connectedness to societal 
norms (figure 1), and the implications for the operation of a firm in a market. It implies that strategic 
legitimacy is connected to whether a firm is deemed a fair player and acceptable competitor, something 
judged on a moral register.  
 
Conclusions 
The work of Karl Polanyi poses some challenging questions for strategy research. We have shown here 
that a Polanyian methodology, that pays attention to questions about the instituted economy, the traits 
of markets, the state’s role in fictitious commodities, and the double movement against morally 
objectionable actions, helps reveal the way the legitimacy of a strategy in society determines responses 
and ultimately success or failure. The Polanyian perspective developed here requires, then, issues of 
power and interests in society to be accounted for. For strategy research, such concerns matter because 
the effects of the double movement that we have shown to be so important in determining strategic 
success and failure are ultimately issues of power and control. In counter-moving against the ‘one firm’ 
strategy, the state and others in Italy were both protecting their cultural and moral interests, and 
constructing forms of power that allowed English firms’ activities to be resisted. Should English firms 
have been powerful enough, the might have been able to impose the ‘one firm’ strategy despite its 
illegitimacy. But, as our story shows, combinations of regulation, the withdrawal of labour (by lawyers 
leaving the firms in question), and deprivation of economic capital (by clients boycotting the firms) 
meant English firms were unable to impose the strategy, and Italian society was able to protect its 
interests. 
A Polanyian analysis shows us, then, that in strategy research questions of power and interests 
are crucial, given that not only is strategy an attempt by firms to exert power to control labour, 
knowledge and other commodities so as to serve corporate economic interests, but it is also subject to 
what Sayer (2004) calls the ‘double contingency’ of all power relations, this being the inevitability of 
resistance that Polanyi shows us comes from the state and society. Again, then, research needs to 
transform some of the questions asked about intra-organizational or industry effects on strategy to allow 
their broader societal effects to be considered. If this is achieved, alongside the broadening out of 
questions of legitimacy and institutions as proposed above, strategy research will be much better 
positioned to understand the multitude of factors determining strategic success and failure. The echoes 
more broadly the way that social science theories can provide critical reflection on strategy (see Brown, 
2018; Butler, 2018; McKinlay and Pezet, 2018; Mueller, 2018; Munro and Thanem, 2018; Neyland and 
Whittle, 2018) as part of efforts to examine both strategy in organisations and society. 
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Table 1 – The ‘Top 3’ Strategy of English law firms in Italy (1993-2000) 
Key Aim Market leadership (top 3 position) in local 
market 
Global integration Low 
Local responsiveness  High 
Market focus Full service 
Client focus Local and Global 
Recruitment focus Superstar practitioners. Focus on local reputation 
and networks.  Locally qualified.  
Administrative units National subsidiaries 
Office structure  Multiple regional offices 
 
 
Table 2 – The ‘One Firm’ Strategy (2000 - current) 
Key Aim Seamless integration (One Firm partnership) 
in global network 
Global integration High 
Local responsiveness  Low 
Market focus Focus on core market (finance) 
Client focus Largely global 
Recruitment focus Cosmopolitans. Focus on organizational abilities 
Administrative units Transnational practice groups 









Figure 1: the relationships between the traits of the Italian legal market, processes of creating 











Table 3: A Polanyian methodology for strategy research and illustrations of the kinds of questions 
it raises 











The production of 
strategy 
 
 How does strategy 
reflect the 
particular 
characteristics of a 
specific instituted 




 How are 
fictitious 
commodities 











promoted by a 
strategy? 




























regulators etc) in 
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 To what extent 






place or time? 
 
 
 To what extent 
does a strategy 







 Could a strategy 
generate a double 




morals in a 
particular place 
or time? 







i This meant that only lawyers registered in particular provincial bar could represent clients in that provinces 
court and effectively inhibited the creation of nation-wide firms  
                                                             
